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The god of Delphi cries to you his oracle: ‘Know yourself.’ It is a hard saying: for that god ‘conceals nothing and says nothing, but only indicates’, as Heraclitus has said. What does he indicate to you? 
Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.

How is one to answer the Delphic injunction which Friedrich Nietzsche once directed at the historian? In other words, how is the historian to understand the present moment, when all that is most solid would seem to melt into the thinnest air? 

A veritable flood of critical reflections on the contemporary, multiplying intersections of technology and the governance of human, embodied existence, including Nikolas Rose’s The Politics of Life Itself and Roberto Esposito’s Bios, has prompted Roger Cooter and Claudia Stein to observe that “biopower,’ a decade ago hardly on any scholar’s lips, is today on almost everyone’s’.​[1]​ Coined during the early decades of the twentieth century, this and cognate terms signalled a growing awareness among cultural commentators of the day that the development of political institutions should be understood as resting less on features of constitutional form and more on the biological features of the populations governed. Due in part to Michel Foucault’s more recent reflections on power and the constitution of the political subject, these terms have been employed ever more widely to clarify exactly how contemporary developments in the biomedical and life sciences are related to the simultaneous transformation of modes of government, chiefly the increasing internalisation of the mechanisms that once aimed to secure the welfare of the nation and its citizens. At the very same time, Timothy Campbell’s Improper Life, the latest addition to these reflections, refers the reader to another feature of the contemporary situation. In this work, Campbell informs the reader that, at a recent conference on ‘politics and life’, a notable, but unnamed, contributor argued that the term ‘biopolitics’ has today gained connotations so expansive that its utility is tested severely. This critical assessment of terminology that seems to be on everyone’s lips is not to be treated lightly because, as Campbell also notes, the speaker is renowned for his understanding of matters foucauldian and, whether rightly or wrongly, all these terms are now associated with Foucault’s name almost inextricably. Even more important, this unnamed contributor also maintains that, in so expanding the connotations of these terms, the value of all humanistic reflection on the present moment is called into question, and it appears, says Campbell, that he ‘wasn’t alone in thinking so’ (p. vii). In sum, it seems that everyone is talking about ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’, but there is so little agreement about the meaning of these terms that one cannot but add that none knows what these words designate, and this lamentable situation cannot but bring into disrepute anyone who would defend the humanities’ capacity to speak to the present moment.​[2]​

Viewed from a different perspective, however, these complaints about the language of critical commentary on the governance of human, embodied existence concern specifically philosophical appropriations of biopolitical terminology. It would seem that these philosophical appropriations refer all discussion of such terminology back to its entanglement, if not complicity, with the history of racism and genocide, and, in so doing, pay scant regard to the positive and affirmative understanding that has emerged from the more historically circumscribed analyses of developments in the life sciences and changing modes of political governance which are advanced by contemporary sociology and anthropology. Thus, for example, Rose and Paul Rabinow, leading proponents of this more circumscribed and positive approach, have argued in their much cited essay on ‘biopower today’ that there are currently philosophers who regard biopower negatively, that is, as a ‘form of politics that is fundamentally dependent on the domination, exploitation, expropriation and, in some cases, elimination of the vital existence of some or all subjects over whom it is exercised’. According to Rabinow and Rose, such understanding of the relationship between governance of the polity and human, embodied existence is simply ‘misleading’.​[3]​ Strikingly, Cooter and Stein contest very sharply the merits of Rabinow’s and Rose’s analyses of the present moment, arguing that Rabinow’s and Rose’s avowed empiricism disables all possibility of critical disposition toward, for example, the ways in which ‘cash-strapped patient self-help groups ... become prey to instrumentalized international bio-tech corporations’.​[4]​ Yet, for all Cooter and Stein’s doubts about the ethnographic sensibilities that drive Rabinow and Rose’s investigation of such matters and their own preference for an explanatory hermeneutic that is invested in disclosing interests and motives, they too regard the abstraction that characterises philosophical reflection as misleading, concluding as they do that ‘the breadth of Foucault’s thinking on biopower cannot be done justice to through a focus entirely on political philosophy and its language’.​[5]​ In sum, it seems that historians, sociologists and anthropologists will all agree that philosophers are a rum lot, given to wild extrapolation and wholly blind to the contingency of the present moment. 

There can be little doubt that Campbell shares these diverse concerns about truthfulness to the present moment. In other words, he shares a sense that our present predicament, whatever it may be, is the product of historical processes, but that these processes do not necessarily determine the shape of things to come. Truthfulness to this understanding entails that we should  regard the present as holding nothing in store for the future, but only for what we do, here and now. Campbell remains sympathetic to philosophical reflection, however, so that the intellectual task of the day, he argues, is to understand why philosophical analyses of biopolitical terminology have proven to be as unproductive as Rabinow and Rose, or Cooter and Stein, maintain. Campbell’s framing of the task and the answers given should be of some interest to historians of science, technology and medicine, especially to those attuned to the fraught relationship between history and philosophy.

The human subject and the question of technology
If there are philosophers who regard biopolitics as a ‘form of politics that is fundamentally dependent on the domination, exploitation, expropriation and, in some cases, elimination of the vital existence of some or all subjects over whom it is exercised’, Tim Campbell focuses on Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito and Peter Sloterdijk as exemplary in this respect. He also argues that their disposition toward the contemporary intersections of technology and human, embodied existence is best understood by first attending to Martin Heidegger’s formative analysis of technology and the human condition. 

Campbell takes as given the reader’s understanding of Heidegger’s endeavour to overcome all metaphysics, and I will only add that this endeavour must be regarded as a fundamentally important to contemporary thought about science, technology and medicine.​[6]​ There is something disconcerting and yet arresting about Heidegger’s simple observation that handwriting distinguishes each one of us from the other and that the typewriter erases that difference, rendering each of us interchangeable with the other. Heidegger writes:
Modern man writes ‘with’ the typewriter ... This ‘history’ of the kinds of writing is one of the main reasons for the increasing destruction of the word. The latter no longer comes and goes by means of the writing hand, the properly acting hand, but by means of the mechanical forces it releases. The typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand ... The word turns into something ‘typed’. Where typewriting, on the contrary, is only a transcription and serves to preserve the writing, or turns into print something already written, there it has a proper, though limited significance ... In addition, mechanical writing ... conceals the handwriting and thereby the character. The typewriter makes everyone look the same (Heidegger, as quoted on p. 4; ellipses added)
These words are inseparable from Heidegger’s argument that humanity’s distinctive capacity to make sense of its inextricable entanglement with all that surrounds each individual is a matter of care and that such care is structured by the absolute uniqueness of each individual’s relation to their mortality. In other words, the human subject is a temporal being and a futural one at that, always racing ahead of itself and making plans because it does not have all the time in the world at his or her disposal. Furthermore, such a subject cares about the world in which it finds itself thrown and is a specifically human subject insofar as it so cares. Against this background, Campbell draws out how Heidegger’s analysis of handwriting and other related situations rests, first, on a distinction between proper and improper relations between this human subject and his or her tools. Heidegger maintains, second, that modern, technological rationality, because it is carelessly blind to the difference between proper and improper relations, transforms the world, including its human denizens, into potential resources, to be stored and made readily available for productive employment. When I become like everyone else, the argument goes, I become eminently replaceable. It is a short step from here to discrimination between forms of life worth living and those not worth living, and, as Heidegger once put it, ‘only a god can [then] save us’.​[7]​ 

Lives not worth living
Campbell’s choice to focus on Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, Peter Sloterdijk is astute. It is not just that these three philosophers are deeply indebted to Martin Heidegger’s analysis of the relationship between technology and the human condition, or that, like Heidegger, they understand the present situation as the product of historical processes. What is particularly interesting is instead that, for all these similarities, they come to very different conclusions about what comportment to take with respect to the contemporary, multiplying intersections of technology and human, embodied existence. 

Agamben, one of the two philosophers to whom Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose attend most closely, is renowned widely for contesting Michel Foucault’s analysis of the processes involved in the production of the political subject. Like Esposito and Sloterdijk, as well as Rabinow and Rose, Agamben agrees with Foucault’s notion that the subject is not primary, that is, he agrees that the subject does not precede, but is instead the product of conceptually prior political processes. He disagrees, however, with Foucault’s distinction between sovereign and governmental deployment of power and with Foucault’s understanding that the coincidence of governmental deployment and the subordination of the subject to the life of the population is a specifically modern development. As Agamben would have it, 
Foucault defines the difference between modern biopower and sovereign power of the old territorial state through the crossing of two symmetrical formulae. To make die and let live summarizes the procedure of old sovereign power, which exerts itself above all as the right to kill; to make live and let die is, instead, the insignia of biopower, which has as its primary objective to transform the care of life and the biological as such into the concern of State power. 
Agamben calls these foucauldian distinctions into question by introducing an alternative perspective on the relationship between sovereign and governmental deployment of power. He writes that,
[a] third formula can be said to insinuate itself between the other two, a formula that defines the most specific trait of twentieth-century biopolitics: no longer either to make die or to make live, but to make survive (Agamben, as quoted on p. 37; emphases in the original).
The further clarification of this alternative advances the notion that the political subject is always already biopolitical. In other words, according to Agamben, the political subject is, at the most essential level, animal substance, zoē, and this substance is sometimes entitled to enjoy the additional, properly human capacity for political life, the additional capacity to become bios politicos. Furthermore, this latter entity is always constituted in a manner such that discrimination between forms of life worth living and those not worth living is inescapable. Viewed from this perspective, there is no great difference between those suspended between life and death that were to be found at Auschwitz and the contemporary patient in a comatose state, each disclosing the nature of power and the processes involved in the production of the subject since time immemorial. Finally and relatedly, the formulation of the relationship between these processes of production and the substance on which they operate as always already in place is intended to indicate how the instalment of the relationship does not happen in historical time, but instead inaugurates historical time. As such, the emergence of the political subject as subject of power is an absolutely and irreducibly contingent event. As Campbell recognises, even if Agamben has qualified this extraordinary argument since the publication of Homo Sacer, Agamben thus leaves no room for the historical determination of the present situation which both Heidegger and Michel Foucault posited.​[8]​ In fact, Agamben’s more recent reflections on historical method in The Signature of All Things, as well as The Kingdom and the Glory, call into question all notions of any historical rupture in the fabric of power.

Campbell does not find Agamben’s argument persuasive because the latter’s understanding of the subject seems to evacuate the subject of all substance and historical location. Esposito and Sloterdijk, on the other hand, seem to offer a far richer understanding of the contemporary, growing entanglement of technology and human, embodied existence. 

Thanks partly to Campbell’s translations, Esposito is gaining some renown as Agamben’s critic who interposes the concept of ‘person’ between power and its object, zoē. As Esposito puts it, 
Person is ... that which, dividing a living being into two natures of different qualities – one subjected to the mastery of the other – creates subjectivity through a procedure of subjugation and objectification. Person is that which renders a part of a body subjected to another to the degree in which it makes of the second the subject of the first ... Man is a person if an only if he masters the more properly animal part of his nature. He is also animal but only so as to be able to subject himself to that part which has received as a gift the charisma of person. Of course not everyone has this tendency or disposition to deanimalize. The degree of humanity present in all will derive from the greater or lesser intensity of deanimalization and so too the underlying difference between he who enjoys the full title of person and he who can enjoy it only if certain conditions have previously been met (Esposito, as quoted on p. 69).
The essentially juridical concept of person, borrowed anachronistically from Roman law, is necessary to any notion of rights, including the person’s rights over his or her own body, and it entails a split between what the human is, his or her body, and what is proper to man, mastery of the relationship to his or her body. 

Both Esposito and Campbell are particularly interested not just in this notion of the person, but also in the further, related notion of the ‘impersonal’. The latter is a relational function of the person that amounts to neither a property of the person, nor a property of the community sanctioning the relationship between the person and their body, but to something beyond both. As Simone Weil once put it, ‘far from its being his person, what is sacred in a human being is the impersonal in him. Everything which is impersonal in man is sacred and nothing else’ (Weil, as quoted on p. 78). This notion is not very distant from Foucault’s notion that ‘it would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives’.​[9]​ 

There can be little doubt that this notion of the ‘impersonal’ offers a powerful point of resistance to the processes which Agamben seeks to unveil. It also reinforces the notion that obliteration of all difference between what the human is and what is proper to the human subject must be recognised as such, that is, as the product of obliteration, answerable to all those questions of agency which Agamben’s analysis forecloses. Yet, as Campbell observes, it also seems that the relationship between the person and their body is precisely the site where the contemporary intersections of technology and human, embodied existence are multiplying most rapidly and devastatingly. If the person is the site of a countervailing power and power is today exercised by enhancing the body’s capacities, according to Esposito’s own understanding, power also seeks to expand its domain. As a result, I seek to become more than my ageing body will allow by taking advantage of proliferating techniques of somatic enhancement such as a corneal transplant to remedy my increasingly blurred eyesight, at the cost of donors’ lives elsewhere. In other words, the very operation of the counterveiling power which the person embodies becomes the contemporary operator of the discrimination between forms of life worth living and those not worth living.​[10]​ 

Campbell then turns to Sloterdijk, who does not recoil from the notion of drawing some distinction between the value of different forms of life. Sloterdijk has acquired some notoriety by rejecting humanist calls for greater regulation and advocating instead the fullest embrace of the contemporary convergence of technology and human, embodied existence, to the point of issuing a set of ‘rules for the human zoo’. ​[11]​ The reasoning leading to such a startling conclusion is provocative. Sloterdijk shares Esposito’s concern about the accelerating atomisation of human existence, which they both convey by deploying the metaphor of immunisation and drawing attention to the intensification of the differentiation between internal organisation and external environment which accompanies immunisation. The dynamics of advanced consumer capitalism, they argue, have so intensified the bounding of the private sphere that all recall to community and place comes to be regarded as a threat to the integrity of the subject. Adding a twist on Esposito’s understanding of the relationship between persons and bodies, Sloterdijk then adds that all who can will flee and it will only be the most disadvantaged who will remain tied by bonds of embodiment: 
The unity of human beings within their own scattered species is today based on the fact that everyone, in the respective lands and histories, have become supplanted, synchronised, battered, and humiliated at a distance; grouped together and oppressed by excessive pretexts – simple sites of their vital illusion, addresses of capital, points in the homogeneous space to which one returns and which turn on themselves – persons who do not see, but are seen persons, who do not understand, but are understood, who do not join, but are joined. Humanity after globalization is composed in the largest part by those who have remained behind in their own skin; of victims of the disadvantage brought on by the location of the ‘I’ (Sloterdijk, as quoted on pp. 93-4).
Where Esposito and Sloterdijk part ways is where the latter comes to regard the full management of embodied existence and globalisation of the gene pool as the key to human salvation:
Royal anthropotechnology ... demands of the statesman that he understand how to bring together free but suggestible people in order to bring out the characteristics that are most advantageous to the whole, so that under his direction the human zoo can achieve the optimum homeostasis. This comes about when the two relative optima of human character or warlike courage and philosophical humanistic contemplation are woven together in the tapestry of the species (Sloterdijk, as quoted on p. 115). 
Needless to say, Sloterdijk’s perspective has invited much criticism for legitimating a return to racism, but such criticism is mistaken because racism is undermined fatally by the globalisation of the gene pool. As Campbell observes, such a perspective is perhaps overly optimistic, but it does call for some revision of the concepts informing any discussion about the politics of genetic discrimination.​[12]​ 

In sum, for all the differences between their answers about what comportment to adopt toward the increasing convergence of technology and human, embodied existence, there can be little doubt that Sloterdijk, Esposito and Agamben share an understanding of biopolitics whereby discrimination between forms of life worth living and those not worth living must intervene at some point or another. Campbell’s thesis is that, so long as one holds on to any heideggerian notion of care and this is predicated on discrimination between proper and improper relations to the tools of care, the present situation cannot but be regarded with foreboding because it would seem to turn the me in each one of us into a something wholly replaceable. Some would say that we have been there before and the name of that place is Auschwitz. 

Decentring the subject
Like Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow, Campbell argues that the answer to the difficulties involved in articulating an engagement with the present biopolitical moment that is more open to novelty and change is to be found by returning to Michel Foucault. Roger Cooter and Claudia Stein come to the same conclusion, but for the opposite reason. Significantly, unlike these other commentators, Campell is less taken by Foucault’s understanding of history, than he is by Foucault’s understanding of the human subject, though the two are not wholly unrelated.​[13]​ 

Campbell reminds the reader that Foucault actually said very little about biopolitics and biopower, and that what Foucault did write can be regarded as being as problematic as anything Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito and Peter Sloterdijk might be said to offer on the subject. It is Foucault who writes, in one earliest formulations of the biopolitical deployment of power, that,
We will have an absolutely fundamental caesura between a level that is pertinent for government’s economic-political action, and this is the level of the population, and a different level, which will be that of the series, the multiplicity of individuals, who will not be pertinent, or rather who will only be pertinent to the extent that, properly managed, maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent ... The population is pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the population (Foucault, as quoted on p. 121).
Campbell does not discuss whether such a perspective on the fate of ‘individuals’ once the ‘population’ becomes the primary object of ‘economic-political action’ is due to Foucault’s own debt to Heidegger, possibly because the relationship between the two is a matter of much disagreement, a disagreement which could be said to begin with Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus’ Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.​[14]​ Campbell argues instead that there is some continuity between, on the one hand, Foucault’s explorations of power and its organisation and, on the other hand, Foucault’s later, more assuredly heideggerian turn to questions of ethics and comportment, to the ‘care of the self’. Such continuity, Campbell claims, allows the reader to glean a philosophically rigorous and more affirmative understanding of biopolitics. Campbell takes his cue from Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France on ‘The Hermeneutics of the Subject’, when Foucault contrasts Classical and Judaeo-Christian modes of constituting the self and claims that,
If we want to understand the form of objectivity peculiar to Western thought since the Greeks we should maybe take into consideration that at a certain moment, in certain circumstances typical of classical Greek thought, the world became the correlate of a tekhnē – I mean that at a certain moment it ceased being thought and became known, measured, and mastered thanks to a number of instruments and objectives which characterized the tekhnē, or different techniques – well, if the form of objectivity peculiar to Western thought was therefore constituted when, at the dusk of thought, the world was considered and manipulated by tekhnē, then I can think we can say this: that the form of subjectivity peculiar to Western thought ... was constituted by a movement that was the reverse of this. It was constituted when the bios ceased what it had been for so long in Greek thought, namely the correlate of a tekhnē; when the bios (life) ceased being the correlate of a tekhnē to become instead the form of a test of the self (Foucault, as quoted on p. 134).
Campbell latches on to the closing connection between ‘bios (life)’ and the ‘self’. He argues that, if biopolitical thought, that thought which correlates the art of being with others and human, embodied existence, seems inevitably to entail some discrimination between forms of life worth living and those not worth living, this is because it is predicated on the equation of self and biological life inherited from Judaeo-Christian culture. As a result of this inheritance, the body has come to be regarded as the site of the discrimination between proper and improper conduct that is required of all those who would accede the good life. Drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s neo-vitalist reflections on the foucauldian oeuvre, Campbell’s answer is to decentre the self and so free the correlation of the art of being with others and human, embodied existence of all reference to death and negation. More specifically, Campbell articulates a notion of existence as ‘practicing bios’ whereby the subject is constituted through a playful relationship to the body, a playful form of life. Almost as if retracing Agamben’s own trajectory, Campbell draws on Walter Benjamin’s notions about children and their toys, about their ability to overcome the ‘dour naturalism’ of toys and become the very things the toys would imitate. He deploys this notion to conjure a relationship between self and the body that allows for endless transformation, writing that ‘a tekhnē of bios thought through play might be one yet unexplored way to forgo ‘the dour naturalism’ of biopolitics today, in which the object of politics would be merely biological life or that would have the object of life be thinkable only as part of a negative politics’ (154).​[15]​ Stelarc’s evocation of a future human who will be endowed with photosynthetic skin springs to mind:
With such a skin we would no longer have need of a mouth to chew, of a throat to swallow, of a stomach to digest, of lungs to breathe. We would be able to leave the human and replace useless organs with technologies. Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha!​[16]​
Anyone sceptical about the transformative power of the avant-garde will hope that tongues and cheeks are lodged very firmly together.​[17]​

As Campbell himself observes, there is much confusion today around the meaning of the term ‘life’ and it is not clear why Campbell’s notion of existence as ‘practicing bios’ should not in fact read ‘practicing zoē’’, bios being the politically qualified form of life and thus not the site of any ‘test of the self’.​[18]​  If the latter is a correct reading of the challenge Campbell envisions, then Campbell’s understanding of the community to come is not in fact very different to Agamben’s notion that freedom is to be found in ‘preferring not’ to be part of any play of subjectivation and desubjectivation, that is, in a mode of being that is beyond either acceptance or refusal of the processes involved in the production and undoing of the subject.​[19]​ While it must remain an open question whether the subject can be annihilated and yet leave a living remnant still capable of play, it is not clear that Campbell’s proposal does in fact overcome the figure of death, at least insofar as the desire to decentre the subject can be viewed as inseparable from the death drive and its own constitutive role in the production of the modern subject. These diverse difficulties raise awkward questions about the insistence that the foucauldian understanding of power as ‘productive’ should exclude all reference to death.​[20]​ There is nothing about Foucault’s own account of such productivity that precludes discrimination between lives worth living and lives not worth living, so long as the discrimination is understood to enhance the productivity of the population. Thus, when Foucault writes of National Socialism and its ‘paroxysm’, the reference is to the order to exterminate the German people when it failed the supreme test, not to the purification of the same people by exterminating all polluting bodies and racial groups.​[21]​ The corollary of such privileging of the population is that the death of any particular individual matters little because the continuity of life takes place at the level of the population and the species. These issues, familiar to the more reflective modern biologist, are bound to create all sorts of problems whenever life is assumed to reside in the individual, and this is the assumption advanced consumer capitalism inherits from Judeo-Christian culture.​[22]​ 

Conclusion
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